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NOTES AND COMMENT

At the present we do not deal with the binding Covenant. Of
course, it is to be wished that the principles embodied in the Charter
would be universally assumed as obligatory in the relations amongst
men and governments everywhere. However, unless and until the
human rights provisions are declared self-executing, our courts are
not justified in anticipating such obligations; for, rather than being
supreme law, the Charter provisions are at the most an indication of
the national public policy. They must therefore await legislative action for only Congress can properly determine how this Government
is to "cooperate" with the United Nations.

THE BAILEE'S RIGHT TO RECOVER FULL DAMAGES: HISTORICALLY

AND CRITICALLY

A person in possession of personal property has the powers of
an owner as against all the world, save the man with a better right
to possession.' This rule of law has always been applied to allow
takers 2 and finders 3 full damages against third persons who converted or damaged the goods. Their right to recover a sum over
and above their own interest in the chattel is based solely on their
possession. Certainly, any other principle would be "an invitation to
all the world to scramble for possession." 4
There are two different opinions, however, as to what is the
basis of the bailee's right to recover full damages from a third person
tortfeasor. One view is that this right exists because of his possesInternational Proposals Affecting So-Called Human Rights, 14

L. & CoNTEMuP.

479 (1949); Rix, Human Rights and International Law: Effect of the
Covenant Under Our Constitution, 35 A. B. A. J. 551 (1949).
There has
been comment on the Covenant in almost every issue of the AmERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION JOURNAL since March, 1948. The arguments against the Covenant
may be summed up in three points.
1. It is an invasion of the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.
2. This country's participation is unconstitutional.
3. Participation is dangerously unwise as our' form of government is
threatened.
In the opinion of the writer of this note, the authorities cited in note 51 supra
have succeeded in refuting these charges.
PROB.

1 HOLEs, THE COMIMON LAW 246 (1881); POLLOCK & WRIGHT, POSSESSION 2 IN THE CoviazoN LAW 93 (1888); RESTATEMAENT, TORTS § 895 (1939).
Anderson v. Gouldberg, 51 Minn. 294, 53 N. W. 636 (1892); accord, New

England Box Co. v. C & R Const. Co., 313 Mass. 696, 49 N. E. 2d 121 (1943).
3 Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722); Deaderick v. Aulds, 86 Tenn. 14, 5 S. V. 487 (1887).
4 Webb v. Fox, 7 Term Reports 392, 397, 101 Eng. Rep. 1037, 1040 (1797).
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sion of the bailed chattel. 5 The other view bases this right on his
liability over to the bailor. 6 The purpose of this article is to briefly
examine the historical development of this right of the bailee, to uncover the reason for these two different opinions, to ascertain the
historically true reason why a bailee may recover full damages, and
to determine whether this rule, which has come down to us from
ancient days, is adaptable to modern principles of law.
It was recognized by the English law of the 12th century that,
by virtue of his possession, the bailee was entitled to all the rights of
an owner as against all the world, except the bailor. Holmes, in reviewing the law of that era, has this to say:
Cattle were the principal property known, and cattle stealing the principal form
of wrongful taking of property. Of law there was very little, and what there
was, depended almost wholly upon the party himself to enforce. . . . If the
cattle were come up with before three days were gone, the pursuer had the
right to take and keep them, subject only to swearing that he lost them against
his will ....
But, if all that a man had to swear was that he had lost possession against his will, it is a natural conclusion that the right to take the oath
and make use of the procedure depended on possession, and not ownership.
Possession was not merely sufficient, but it was essential . . . this procedure
. . . was the only remedy and was confined to the man in possession .... 7

As the bailee, alone, had redress, s it was only just that he should be
responsible to his bailor. It is for this reason that, originally, the
liability of the bailee to his bailor was absolute.9
In the 13th century, however, a new approach gradually ap-

peared. Judicial reasoning, heavily influenced by the legal renaissance of the 12th century,' 0 and by the introduction of Roman legal
concepts, developed the thought that the basis of the bailee's right
to recover was his liability over to the bailor, rather than his possession." No longer could a bailee in possession be regarded as an
owner, for now, unlike a taker or finder, he openly acknowledged the
better title of his bailor. Since under such circumstances possession
was apparently not equal to ownership, the only position consistent
with reason was a holding that the right to sue was based upon lia5

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 164 et seq.
POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAW 166 (1888).
6

(1881); POLLOCK &

WRGHT,

See the discussion of this view in Terry v. Pennsylvania R. R., 35 Del. 1,
WALSH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH & AMERICAN LAW § 79

156 Alt. 787 (1931);

(1926).

7 HOLMES, THE COiMImON LAW 165 (1881); see 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 157 (2d ed. 1899).
s 1 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 43 (1947).
9 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 167 (1881). But see Beale, The Carrier's

Liability: Its History, 11 HARv. L. REV. 158 (1897),
absolute liability rule was ever the law of England.

who doubts that the

10 WALSH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH & AMERICAN LAW § 1 (1926).
113 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 341 (3d ed. 1927).
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bility over. 12 At first, the bailee was answerable to the owner because he was the only person who could sue. Now it was said that
he could sue because he was answerable to the owner. 13
The question now arises as to what is the historically true reason
for allowing the bailee to sue for full damages. Is it his liability over,
or his possession? It may be said in support of the "liability over"
theory that since written records were not commonly kept in early
English law, it is by no means certain that the bailor was unable to
sue and was limited solely to a remedy against the bailee.1 4 If in
fact the bailor could sue, the bailee's right probably stemmed more
from his liability over than from his possession. Moreover, in the
13th century, it was definitely established that the basis of the bailee's
right was his liability over to his bailor,
and this was accepted as the
15
true reason down to the 19th century.
In support of the "possession" theory, Holdsworth contends:
I think the evidence goes to show that the bailee's right to sue was based on
his possession. It is, I think . . . that English law did start from the old
conception of the Germanic law Which gave the bailee as possessor the rights
and powers of the owner. It is no doubt true that these old conceptions were
modified as the result of the legal renaissance of the 13th century. But they
were not wholly got rid of ..... No doubt the Roman conceptions of ownership and possession exercised a disturbing influence ....
But ... [it did not]

succeed in ousting the old idea that possession is ownership as against all the
world, save as against the man with the better right.16

If we accept the "possession" theory, not only historical accuracy,
but also consistency in reasoning is obtained, as the same common law
principles will apply to a bailee as well as to a taker or finder whose
rights as a possessor have never been doubted. If we accept the
"liability over" theory, an irregularity is introduced into our conception of possession, because we must then treat a bailee differently
than other possessors. Even though the "liability over" theory was
constantly repeated down through the centuries, it can be stated that
this reiteration was made in cases in which the statement was
inconsequential.
Throughout the Middle Ages, and to a great extent down to the
end of the 17th century, the basis of the bailee's right to recover was
not a question of much practical importance. The only exceptions
to the absolute liability rule were cases in which the bailee was unable to sue anyone, namely, when the bailed property was destroyed
12 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 11, at 339; PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE
HISTORY
OF THE CoinioN LAW 421 (2d ed. 1936).
3
1 HOLUEs, THE CoMioN LAW 167 (1881).
14 PLUCKNEIT, op. cit. supra note 12, at 421; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, Op.
cit. supra note 7, at 172.
15 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 11, at 341; Claridge v. South Staffordshire Ry., [1892] 1 Q. B. 422.
16 3 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 11, at 346.
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by the king's enemies or by an act of God.1 7 Consequently, there
was no urgency to resolve what was then an academic question and
thus we find during the 17th,' 8 18th, 19 and 19th 20 centuries, the
statement that the bailee can recover full damages, because of his
liability over reiterated.
But when the bailee's liability is no longer considered absolute,
the question ceases to be merely academic. Cases will then arise in
which the bailee is not liable to the bailor, and if his right to recover
full damages is based on liability over, it can be readily seen that he
will fail in his action, while, if his right is based on possession, he can
recover full damages.
Although the absolute liability rule of the bailee was being repeated as late as the 17th century,21 it was being indirectly weakened
in many ways. 22 These tendencies culminated in the elimination of
23
the bailee's absolute liability by Holt, C.J., in Coggs v. Bernard.
As a result of that decision, the question of the basis of the bailee's
right to recover full damages became a practical one.
The issue was not finally settled, however, until 1901, when the
Court of Appeal in The Winkfield case 2 4 authoritatively decided in
favor of the view that the bailee's right to sue for full damages is
based on his possession. Collins, M.R., said:
...I have now shewn by authority, the root principles of the whole discussion is that, as against a wrongdoer, possession is title. The chattel that has
been converted or damaged, is deemed to be the chattel of the possessor and
of no other, and, therefore, its loss or deterioration is his loss, and to him, if
he demands it, it must be recouped. His obligation to account to the bailor
is really not ad rem in the discussion ....

As between bailee and stranger

possession gives title-that is, not a limited interest, but absolute and complEte
ownership, and he is entitled to receive back25 a complete equivalent for the
whole loss or deterioration of the thing itself.
17 PLUCKNETT, op. cit. supra note 12, at 423; WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 44 (1947).

Is

Southcot v. Bennet, 1 Cro. Eliza. 815, 78 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1601); see

Heydon & Smith's Case, 13 Co. Rep. 68, 77 Eng. Rep. 1477, 1478 (1611).
19 CHAEs'S BLACKSTONE 563 (2d ed. 1884).

20 Rooth v. Wilson, 1 B. & Ald. 59, 106 Eng. Rep. 22 (1817); Claridge v.
South Staffordshire Ry., [18921 1 Q. B. 422.
21 Southcot v. Bennet, 1 Cro. Eliza. 815, 78 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1601).
22 Bailees were making special contracts with their bailors which excluded
the rule of absolute liability. Servants and factors were excluded from the
category of bailees. The supersedence of detinue, the bailor's action against
the bailee by actions on the case of assumpsit or otherwise, threw emphasis on
negligence or contract liability. See PLUCKNErr, A CONCIsE HIStORY OF THE

COmmON LAW

423 (2d ed. 1936).

2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703). His historical investigation
showed that there was no authority for the decision in the Southcot's Case,
1 Cro. Eliza. 815, 78 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1601), and for its rigid rule of absolute
liability. He substituted several rules requiring standard of care suitable to
the different sorts of bailment.
24 [1902] 1 P. 42.
23

25

Id. at 60.
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There appears to be little doubt as to the historical accuracy of the
Winkfield holding. An overwhelming majority of courts favor the
"possession" theory today.26
It has been observed that in early English law, the right of the
bailee to recover the chattel was justifiable because he was the only
one with a remedy; that the bailee's right to recover full damages
during the Middle Ages and down to Coggs v. Bernard was a reasonable conclusion to the premise that he was absolutely liable over to
the bailor. Now it must be determined whether or not this right to
recover full damages, even though he is not liable, by virtue of the
"possession" theory is sound and equitable today.
By endorsing this theory, the courts adhere to the common law
doctrine that possession of personal property gives rise to title good
as against all but the true owner. It has a stabilizing effect by preventing that which Lord Keyes predicted would occur if the rule in
relation to possession was otherwise: namely, a scramble for
chattels.2 7 It is practical and expedient in some cases. Today, as in
early days of English law, situations arise whereby the bailee can
more effectively invoke legal processes against the wrongdoer than
the bailor. For example, where the bailed goods are damaged or
converted in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the bailment
relation arose, the bailee unquestionably learns of the wrong before
the bailor, and has a better understanding of the facts which constitute the wrong.28 It is also economical to both the public and the
parties involved, because generally the full amount of damages are
recovered in a single litigation.
But, although one agrees with the correctness of the Winkfield
decision and appreciates some of its ensuing advantages, it is submitted that it gives rise to some difficulties. We have here a problem
involving three interested parties, where one of them does not participate in the litigation. Therefore, we must judge the effect of the
holding upon the absent bailor. Has the court been heedful of his
position? Also, what are the effects upon the present parties? Has
the court given the wrongdoer and the bailee adequate consideration?
The problem is not a simple one because the outcome of a particular
set of circumstances is not always easily manifested. Historical facts
should be discriminatingly utilized, as they may befuddle rather than
26 United Fruit Co. v. United States, 33 F. 2d 664 (5th Cir. 1929); Associates Discount Corp. v. Gillinean, 322 Mass. 490, 78 N. E. 2d 192 (1948);
Motor Finance Co. v. Noyes, 139 Me. 159, 28 A. 2d 235 (1942); Berger v.
34th St. Garage, 274 App. Div. 414, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (1st Dep't 1948);
Sumner v. Brenner, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 250 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ;, Hopkins v. Colonial
Stores, 224 N. C. 137, 29 S. E. 2d 455 (1944); RESTATEmENT, ToRTs §218,
comment h, § 222, comment h (1934).
27 See note 4 supra.
28 Instances in which this practical advantage may exist, however, are principally cases of common carriers, who are not generally within the class of
bailees with which we are concerned, because of their quasi-insurer nature.
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aid one. Our task does not end with the answer that this or that
principle of law is historically correct. We must go further and ascertain whether or not it is adaptable today as a fair-working rule of law.
It can not be denied that in resolving the rights of takers and
finders there is a feasible explanation for adhering to the "possession"
theory. In most of these cases, the owner is unknown and his future
identification is a matter of pure speculation, thus the court is justified in refusing to spend time and money in an attempt to determine
whether or not the plaintiff has title. In these instances, in order to
expedite the dispensation of justice, the courts are required to take
such a position. The status of a bailee, however, who is not liable is
perspicuously distinguishable from these cases. He admits the title
to be in an ascertained owner and he is under no duty to that owner
to reimburse him for the loss from his personal or individual assets.
In a substantial number of suits brought by the bailee against a third
person wrongdoer, the bailee's interest, if any, is very small in contrast to the bailor's interest. Notwithstanding this, he is permitted
to sue without the knowledge or consent 29 of the bailor for the full0
value of damages to the bailed property caused by the tortfeasor.3
One example will suffice to point up the problem facing the bailor.
A bailee hires a car worth $3500 from the bailor for one week at the
approximate charge of $25. The car, while in the bailee's possession,
is converted on the fifth day of the bailment by X. We know that
the bailee's interest in the car at this time is negligible compared with
the bailor's interest. The bailee then commences an action for conversion without the knowledge or consent of the bailor. In consequence, the bailor is barred from bringing a later action; 81 he is
denied the right to elect between trover and replevin; he is not consulted in the choice of the attorney representing the bailee; and he
is not approached to give an estimate of the value of his automobile.
It is true that he may compel the bailee to account to him for his
share of the recovery:
the bailee has to account for the thing bailed, so he must account for that
which has become its equivalent and now represents it. What he3 2has, received
above his own interest, he has received to the use of his bailor.
29
See Berger v. 34th St. Garage, 274 App. Div. 414, 418, 84 N. Y. S. 2d
348, 352 (1st Dep't 1948).
3o Smyth v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 326 Pa. 391, 192 Atl. 640,
644 (1937); Kerr v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 129 Me. 48, 149 Atl.
618 (1930) ; see note 26 supra.
s1 See The Vale Royal, 51 F. Supp. 412, 423 (Md. 1923) ; First Commercial
Bank of Pontiac v. Valentine, 209 N. Y. 145, 150, 102 N. E. 544, 546 (1913) ;
Fletcher v. Perry, 104 Vt. 229, 158 Atl. 679, 681 (1932). The statement in
these cases is in the nature of dicta, a prior recovery by the bailor or bailee
not being indicated by the facts. But we can be assured that if the bailee has
full recovery, the courts would invoke the doctrine that a wrongdoer can not
be vexed twice for the same wrong.
82 The Winkfield, [1902] 1 P. 42, 60.
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This constructive trust doctrine is of little value to him if through
the incompetency of the attorney chosen by the bailee, or through
the indifference of the bailee, or if the bailee enters into a settlement
agreement with the tortfeasor,3 3 the proceeds recovered are less than
the actual value of his property.
Even on the assumption that the bailee is a prudent plaintiff and
engages a competent attorney, and does not settle the suit, another
problem presents itself. This is the possibility that the bailee may,
by concealing his assets or by absconding, make the bailor's right
against him for an accounting of no real value. Furthermore, even
if the bailee does not conceal or abscond, he still has a definite advantage over his bailor. The question then arises as to the amount each
is to receive so as to satisfy his respective interest. Keeping in mind
that the bailee has possession of the assets, it is apparent that he has
a bargaining power over his bailor. The bailor in many instances
will settle for a sum less than his real interest rather than engage in
costly litigation to require an accounting by the bailee.
The result of the Winkfield decision thus has the following consequences: it is completely attentive to the tortfeasor's position by
protecting him from double liability; it gives more than sufficient consideration to the bailee by allowing him to recover over and above his
own interest in the chattel; it fails to protect the bailor adequately,
who, when one considers the modern conception of ownership, should
be considered above the other two. This problem presents a situation which calls for correction. There is no practical reason for permitting the bailee to recover the full damages to property in his possession in cases where, under modern legal principles, he is not liable.
There are two ways in which the protection of the bailor could
be realized. One school of thought feels that since this is not an
open question, but rather one which has been accepted down through
history, arguments for its revision should be addressed to the legislature. The other contends that we should not be bound by an early
common law rule unless it is supported by reason and logic. What
may have been a practical common law rule years ago may not be
adaptable to the changed conditions and principles of law of modern
society, and thus should be modified by the courts.
We must now determine which of the above two currents of
thought is more satisfactory to provide the bailor with adequate
protection.
There is no doubt that when a given rule of law proves to be
inadequate we are prone to say that this is a problem for the
legislature. This, of course, is the simplest method to dispense with
an issue. But it is submitted that such an attitude is not conducive
to progressive legal thought. There are occasions when legislative
approval and sanction are conditions precedent to the correction of
33While a court action is public notice to all concerned, a settlement or
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an inequity but it is suggested that this problem is not one of those
instances. The legislature should not be unduly burdened. The
difficulty can be satisfactorily resolved by judicial action.
Before passing to a consideration of these suggestions, it might
be well to mention that there is existing legislation which might be
implemented to alleviate some of the difficulty of 'our problem. A
majority of jurisdictions now permit intervention by an interested
party in an action. One phase of it is Section 193(b) of the New
York Civil Practice Act. 34

A part of this statute which might be

applied here, states, that upon timely application any person shall be
permitted to intervene in an action, when the representation of the
applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and
the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action. This
is, of course, only a partial solution. It is only effective when the
bailor knows of the litigation by the bailee. It does not aid or protect the bailor who is ignorant of the action.
Then there is Section 193, subdivision 1, of the New York Civil
Practice Act which might be utilized.3 5 Its objective was to substantially revise the Civil Practice Act, with respect to parties to an
action. In effect, it is a statutory classification of necessary parties
into (1) indispensable and (2) conditionally necessary parties. If
the bailor were considered a conditionally necessary party, the court
could, upon its own motion or the motion of a party to the action,
order the bringing in of the omitted bailor provided he is subject to
the jurisdiction of the court.36 This section does not fully correct
our problem because two conditions must be met. First, the courts
must consider the bailor a conditionally necessary party. There has
37
been no indication that the courts are inclined to such a proposition.
Secondly, the bailor must be subject to the court's jurisdiction. This
would not occur in some cases because the bailed property is removed
to foreign jurisdictions.
By way of analogy, we can refer to a section in the New York
Real Property Law, which protects the interest of those who have
a future interest in the land, by requiring that they be made parties
to any proceeding for damages.3 8 Those who favor legislative action
release may be negotiated in secret. Thus, the settlement must be a "fair"
settlement without fraud or collusion in order to bind the bailor. But what is
"fair" may be slightly less in some instances than the actual value. Belli v.
Forsyth, 301 Mass. 203, 16 N. E. 2d 656 (1938) ; National Bond & Investment
Co. v. Gill, 123 Pa. Super. 341, 187 Atl. 75 (1936).
34 Laws of N. Y. 1946, c. 971; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
35 Laws of N. Y. 1946, c. 971; see also PRASHKER, Nzw YORK PRACTICE
184 (1947).
36 12 REPORTS OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL 180 (1946).
37 The writer has been unable to find any case in which there has been a
discussion of the desirability of classifying a bailor as a conditionally necessary
party.
38 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 538 which says, "When the ownership of land
is divided into a possessory estate for life or for years and one or more future
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as the solution to the bailor's problem may well argue: Why not a
similar statute to protect the owner-bailor of personal property?
With respect to the heretofore mentioned statement that judicial
action could satisfactorily settle our problem, we shall consider two
suggestions which could be accepted as a suitable plan for protecting
the bailor. The first would apply the well known principle of reason
which in substance declares that even though a rule of law is historically true, that fact alone is not an adequate defense for its continued existence and, therefore, it should be modified by decisional
law. In cases where the bailee is no longer liable over, he should be
restricted to recovering only to the extent of his own interest. The
bailor should recover his own damages. Some courts have, under
another factual relationship, applied this reasoning. At one time a
tenant for life or years could recover for permanent damages to the
freehold. The reason for this was that the landlord had no cause
of action against the trespasser. 39 In consequence, the tenant was
liable over for damages caused by a third person. Later the landlord
had a cause of action against strangers. Thus the reason for the
earlier rule allowing a tenant to recover for permanent damage ceased
to exist and the courts now stated that the tenant could only recover
for the damages caused to his interest in the property. 40
The second and most salutary solution suggested is that before
the bailee is allowed to collect in full when he is not liable over, there
should be some indication that the owner-bailor acquiesces in the lawsuit. This permission, it is said, may be either expressed or implied.
... if the bailee's collection from the wrongdoer is to bar the bailor from any
action against the wrongdoer, the law ought not to allow the bailee to collect

full damages, unless that is done with the expressed or implied consent of the
bailor.4 1
If the bailor consents to the bailee's commencement of an action
for full damages, the heretofore mentioned criticisms may not be
raised. Consent in this sense implies authority to act on one's behalf.
interests, and a person having none of these interests causes damage to such
land, the damages recoverable by the owner of such possessory interest from
the wrongdoing third person may include damages caused to interests in the
affected land other than those owned by parties to the action or proceeding
when, but only when, all living persons who have either a possessory or future
interest in the affected land are parties thereto . .. ."
1
39
N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 531; Rogers v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co.,

213 N. Y. 246, 253, 107 N. E. 661, 662 (1915).
4 Zimmerman v. Shreeve, 59 Md. 357 (1882) (defendant cut timber, lessee
recovered compensation only for his interest) ; Carter v. Cairo R. R., 240 Ill.
152, 88 N. E. 493 (1909) (mining property damaged by defendant, lessee recovered only up to the value of his term) ; Brouster v. Shell Pipe Line Corp.,
16 S. W. 2d 672 (Mo. 1929); Shell Petroleum v. Parker, 37 S. W. 2d 1064
(Tex. 1931); RE-STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 118 (1936). Contra: Rogers v.
Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 213 N. Y. 246, 107 N. E. 661 (1915).
41 Warren, Qualifying as Plaintiff in an Action for a Conversion, 49 HAv.

L. REv. 1084, 1097 (1936).
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It may be presumed, therefore, that the bailor will allow the bailee to
act on his behalf only after he is assured that the bailee will carry on
with the utmost consideration, in respect to the bailor's interest in
the property. If perchance, the bailee, after consent is given, acts in
a manner detrimental to the bailor, the answer will not be that a rule
of law, but rather that the bailor's own act denied him the consideration to which he is entitled. If the bailor does not consent to the
bailee's suit, there is no problem. The bailor will then pursue his
own remedies and he cannot complain of his own deeds whatever
their consequences. But what of the wrongdoer? This suggestion
involves the possibility of two suits against him. Is it not more efficient for the administration of justice and more just to the wrongdoer
to settle the matter in one action? There is undoubtedly merit in
these contentions. They are counterbalanced, however, when we
realize the inadequate consideration given to the bailor under the
present principle and that if it were not for the wrongdoer's action,
we would have no problem. Moreover, the policy of eliminating
multiplicity of suits whenever possible should not be extended to
situations wherein one party may be harmed by its enforcement.
It is apparent that this latter recommendation effectually solves
our problem. The introduction of this prerequisite to the bailee's
commencement of an action for full damages when he is not liable
would produce the resultant effect we are seeking; namely, the full
protection of the bailor's interest.

PROBLEMS OF THE INVENTOR UNDER THE AToMIc ENERGY ACT

Introduction
A strange phenomenom of the so-called Atomic Age is that the
Atomic Energy Act itself has received so little public discussion.1
The Act is a relatively radical departure from the precepts normally
followed in government activities.2 A huge and powerful government organization is created and private activity in the same field is
proscribed.3 Private possession of more than a trifling amount of
the source materials of atomic energy is forbidden unless under
government license for research or medical purposes. 4 Even then
I See Marks. The Atomic Energy Act: Public Administration Without
Public Debate, 15 U. OF Car. L. Rin. 809 (1948). Mr. Marks was General
Counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission.
2 See Miller, A Law is Passed-The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 15 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 799 (1948).
3 60 STAT. 759, 42 U. S. C. A. 1804(b) (Supp. 1949).
460 STAr. 760, 42 U. S. C. A. 1805(a) (Supp. 1949).

